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Background The energy trilemma (e. g. by the world energy council [1], an UN-accredited global energy body or 
the scientific community [2]) and the United Nations sustainable development goals (UN Sustainable Development 
Goal 7: “Ensure access to  affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all as one piece of sustainable 
 development of the future world”[3]) form the key drivers for the future of all kinds of energy research. These goals 
lead to a strong, urgent  demand for reliable as well as controllable low carbon electricity production technologies to 
address the low carbon strategies following the commitments of the COP 21 agreement in Paris [4]. For the United 
Kingdom, Nuclear  technologies are recognized to have the potential to become the key technology to meet the CO2 
 reduction targets, but only if the development targets for nuclear will be met. However, the Emissions Gap Report 2017 
of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) [5] identified that the Contributions set in Paris 2015 will even not 
be sufficient to hold global warming to well below 2 °C. In 2007, the UK formally re-introduced nuclear power into its 
overall energy policy followed by a long-term Nuclear Energy Strategy in 2013 [6], leading to subsequent plans to build 
new reactors. These plans are now starting to materialize at the Hinckley Point C site [7] with the construction of two 
pressurized water reactors and the Wylfa project [8], which is foreseen to lead to two advanced boiling water reactors, 
even if  currently on indefinite hold. However, these projects rely on commercially existing technologies, delivered by 
 worldwide acting companies, and are essentially based on technology developments of the 50ies and 60ies. In addition, 
the  decision for the new build programme, along with the closing down of reprocessing in 2018 [11], creates a demand 
for developing novel, innovative technologies to deal with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of existing and upcoming reactors. 
The case for recycling (reprocessing) is driven by factors such as closing the fuel cycle and the costs of disposal/burning 
of transuranic, with various scenarios proposed [16, 17].  
In general, two different approaches 
for research and development (R&D) 
of new technologies can be distin-
guished: the demand or user driven 
innovation vs the technology driven. 
Historically, nuclear industry has been 
mostly applying the technology driven 
approach to create novel solutions 
and technologies in an evolutionary 
manner. A typical example is the 
 development of the closed nuclear 
 fuel cycle based on applying repro-
cessing technologies (PUREX process) 
which have been developed to 
 separate Plutonium from irradiated 
fuel.  The cycle can be closed using 
fast reactor technology which has 
 existed since 1951, when the first 
 power-generating nuclear reactor, 
the liquid metal-cooled fast reactor 
EBR1, was put into operation [9]. 
 Another example is the nuclear 
waste management using the tech-
nology of partitioning and trans-
mutation (P&T), separating long-
lived TRUs and burning them in reac-
tors [10]. The partitioning is based 
on the existing PUREX process with 
additional downstream processes for 
minor actinide separation and the 
transmutation uses liquid metal 
cooled fast reactors. 
We propose a much more strategic 
approach applying demand driven 
 innovation and strategic development 
procedures to direct nuclear tech-
nologies into a brighter future [18, 
19]. In our view, the technology 
 driven approach has not been success-
ful in re- creating the strongly required 
belief in nuclear technologies, which 
has been lost in the 1980ies. However, 
belief in a technology is the key 
to get the urgently needed public, 
 private and political support. The key 
points for the strategic development 
process are combined in the ques-
tions: 
 p What technologies are currently 
existing and where does these 
come from? 
 p What is the demand we are 
 currently facing and what is 
 expected for the future? 
This information will be used to 
 develop a vision for the future to 
 provide a direction for the researchers 
and a mission to come as close as 
 possible to this vision or dream.
Demand Driven Strategic 
 Development
Based on the demand of sustainable 
power production, see “energy tri-
lemma” and UN SDG7, the next, 
 disruptive development step should 
be driven by an ultimate, holistic 
 vision for any kind of energy pro-
duction. This  vision needs to be by 
definition much more advanced than 
the development goals of the first 
 nuclear reactors, and broader than the 
goals of the  Generation IV interna-
tional Forum – a co-operative interna-
tional endeavour, set up to carry out 
the R&D  needed to establish the next 
generation nuclear energy systems 
[12]. This vision (call it a dream or the 
end of the rainbow) can be given with 
one  simple, old phrase – “perpetuum 
 mobile” or by the old promise of 
 nuclear, “too cheap to meter” (now-
adays economically as well as environ-
mentally), whilst recognising that 
this represents as a conclusion an 
 unattainable goal. Fredmund Malik 
characterizes the function of vision 
and mission as follows: “A mission is 
definitely necessary… It often follows 
from a very broad and far-reaching 
idea which could be called a vision or 
a dream. That dream, however, has to 
be transformed into a viable mission: 
this is the only way to distinguish 
 useful from useless visions” [13], see 
Figure 1.
When translating the vision into 
the mission some realistic limitations 
have to come into play to create a 
 solvable challenge. It is fairly obvious 
why the vision is unattainable, the 
first and second laws of thermo-
dynamics prevent the “perpetuum 
mobile” from operation outside of the 
hypothetical.  Harsh economic lessons 
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we have learned over the last four 
 decades have shown that “too cheap 
to meter” is equally unobtainable in a 
modern world. Thus we should call 
both a dream or “the end of the 
 rainbow”. However, this dream 
 provides a far-reaching development 
goal which should give R&D the right 
direction. The key words for our vision 
and the goals of our mission are given 
below:
The very general vision has to be 
developed into a mission, which is 
 demand specific. It reflects a weight-
ing of the different attributes forming 
the vision. Our mission could be, to 
develop a reactor that can breed and 
burn its own fuel using existing SNF 
stockpiles. This mission for a disrup-
tive nuclear energy system forms the 
basis for creating an economically as 
well as environmentally sustainable 
approach to deliver a solution for the 
future massive demand on low carbon 
energy production. Besides the dis-
cussed sustainability, the ideal disrup-
tive nuclear system has to deliver a 
solution for historically created pro-
blems of nuclear reactor operation, 
the nuclear waste accumulation while 
avoiding the creation of additional 
proliferation issues.  “Nuclear pro-
liferation, [is] the spread of  nuclear 
weapons, nuclear weapons tech-
nology, or fissile material to countries 
that do not already possess them” 
[24].  Our mission leads to a fast 
molten salt reactor and the related, 
significantly reduced fuel cycle with 
the potential for massively improved 
sustainability indices, see Figure 2. 
The approach is based on a system 
 operating on existing SNF without 
 prior reprocessing. 
Assembling all given arguments, 
the aim is to harvest the fruits of the 
closed fuel cycle, while avoiding the 
massive upfront investment which has 
always been associated with liquid 
metal cooled fast reactors (like the 
French PHENIX/SUPERPHENIX re-
actors) and aqueous reprocessing 
(like THORP in Sellafield/UK). 
Today, almost all nuclear reactors 
are operated in open fuel cycle mode, 
see Figure 3. This terminus describes, 
the process when fuel is produced, 
 only once inserted into a reactor and 
then stored/disposed in the form of 
fuel assemblies without further treat-
ment of the SNF. For a future nuclear 
system with improved sustainability 
indices, it has always been envisaged 
to achieve closed fuel cycle operation 
and the feasibility has been demon-
strated, applying fast reactor tech-
nology [16]. The UK has followed this 
approach too, which led to the indus-
trial reprocessing of SNF at Sellafield 
and the demonstration of fast reactor 
technology in the Dounreay fast 
 reactor (DFR) and the prototype fast 
reactor (PFR). However, closure of the 
fuel cycle has never been achieved on 
an industrial scale leading to a stock-
pile of separated Pu as leftover of 
the successful reprocessing without 
 having the required fast reactor tech-
nology established. The driver for 
the closure of the fuel cycle had 
 dis appeared after the oil crisis had 
been resolved, the uranium prices 
 decreased, and the growth rate of the 
nuclear reactor programmes slowed 
worldwide after the Three Mile Island 
accident. Fast reactor technology as 
well as the required fuel cycle tech-
nologies, specifically the production 
of the required Pu bearing mixed 
 oxide fuel, has been shown, to be 
much more complex to be operated 
than expected. 
With the view on long term 
 sustainability, the challenges of the 
 final disposal, and the demand for a 
massive growth of the nuclear power 
as one of the most attractive low 
 carbon technologies, we propose to 
revive closing the fuel cycle but in 
 contrast to the historic approaches 
now by applying new, demand driven, 
tailored technologies. 
We will consider the idea of closing 
the nuclear fuel cycle using a molten 
salt fast reactor operating on SNF 
which will neither require a supply 
with new, fresh fuel nor create addi-
tional waste to the already existing 
SNF. In comparison to today’s  strategy, 
see Figure 3, there are significantly 
fewer steps and fewer specific 
 demands. The most significant of 
which is that a fast reactor demands a 
significantly higher amount of fissile 
material in the core than in a thermal 
reactor. This forms the need for 
some additional fissile material 
for the start-up, either by enriched 
Uranium or by Plutonium originating 
from historic reprocessing operation 
like it is avail able in the UK. The 
additional fissile material is only 
 required for the start-up phase, 
during operation sufficient new fissile 
 | Fig. 1.  
The steps of the strategic development process  
for future nuclear reactor systems.
 | Fig. 2.  
Expected improvements by the proposed disruptive demand driven, innovative development.
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material will be bred from the fertile 
U-238. 
The feasibility of operating purely 
on SNF has been demonstrated using 
advanced modelling & simulation 
(M&S) [18, 19]. The inserted SNF 
(~95% Uranium, ~1% Plutonium 
and ~4% fi ssion products) will be 
transformed into vast amounts of 
 energy and a clean stream of fi ssion 
products, partly out of the salt clean-
up system, partly appearing in the 
 off-gas scrubbing system. Both 
streams have to be conditioned in an 
appropriate way to limit the source 
term under accidental conditions. 
Compared to the existing process , 
considering spent nuclear fuel as 
waste, the mass of waste will remain 
the same, while the short term activity 
will clearly increase due to the pro-
portionality between the amount of 
 fi ssion products and the amount of 
 energy produced out of the fuel. The 
energy ‘squeezed out’ from the SNF 
will be increased by a factor of 20 
which will lead to the increase of short 
term  activity (up to 500 years) while 
the long term activity will be signifi -
cantly reduced due the burning of  all 
TRUs. 
This  proposed innovative nuclear 
system will require a complete re- 
design of the nuclear chemistry 
 applied in the salt clean-up based on 
the principles  described in [19] using 
the inter- disciplinary optimization 
 potential described in “Demand 
 driven salt clean-up in a molten salt 
fast reactor – Defi ning a priority list” 
[20]. There are further challenges to 
be con sidered on the development 
path. Challenges on plant structural 
inte grity will need to be addressed 
 either through clever design or opera-
tional procedures. Control systems 
will also need to be developed to 
 manage plant throughput against the 
strong thermal feedback effects that 
would occur in such a reactor system 
which is an essential part of the 
 general safety  approach which has to 
be developed among the other chal-
lenges [21]. We would be expect to be 
able to exploit a range of technical 
inno vations drawn from outside of the 
 nuclear sector. Digitalisation and 
 industry 4.0 are  delivering digital 
twin solutions that create a high 
 degree of confi dence in our ability to 
effectively operate such a plant. 
The consequences  of the proposed 
approach on the fuel  cycle, see Figure 
3, are massive since the whole concept 
of the complex closed fuel cycle will 
be replaced by a really slick process 
with promised lower complexity, less 
proliferation concern, and because of 
this reason, cost reductions can be re-
alised across the industry. 
Based on the calculations that have 
been performed to date the overall 
performance indicators of a closed 
 fuel cycle based on the molten salt fast 
reactor are impressive. The neutronic 
feasibility study indicated that a 
 classical 3 GWth reactor (roughly 
equivalent in scale to Sizewell B) 
could be operated for 60 years on 
130  tons of SNF and ~ 17 tons of 
 plutonium [18, 19] for the start-up. 
Thus the UK Pu stockpile of 140 tons 
in 2020 [22] would be suffi cient to 
start 8 reactors and the currently 
stored 8000 tons of SNF (6000 t AGR 
fuel, 2000 t LWR fuel [23]) would be 
suffi cient to operate these 8 reactors 
for more than 930 years each. 
Taking a view into the UK approach 
to build several new light water 
 reactors and the opportunity of 
 increasing the number of reactors by 
splitting the salt of operating reactors, 
it gets clear that this reactor system 
could be a long term available, 
 reliable, and sustainable low carbon 
electricity source.
The process of developing 
a new, innovative nuclear 
 energy system
This journey will be started with a 
glance into the historic steps and time 
scales of, at that time, new reactor 
 developments. It will be followed by a 
short description of each process step 
for a state of the art development  plan 
to get a deeper understanding what 
would have to be done to make a new, 
disruptive nuclear energy system real. 
This will lead at the end to a short 
closing remark on the role of the 
 government required for success.
A Glance into History
The analysis of the historic develop-
ment of UKs MAGNOX technology 
gives insight into the time scale as well 
as the process of a new reactor devel-
opment, even when it has taken place 
in the middle of the last century. 
Figure 4 shows the timeline of the 
 development with several zero power 
facilities GLEEP (Graphite Low  Energy 
Experimental Pile) in 1947 to Wind-
scale-1 in 1952 [26], which have 
been used to get fi rst insight into the 
considered technology and to create 
the skilled workforce for the next 
steps. This fi rst phase  was followed by 
a small scale experimental reactor 
Calder Hall (180 MWth), and after 
several intermediate steps the full 
scale demonstrator, with the Hinckley 
Point power stations achieving 
almost 1000 MWth. The application 
of  modern, digital M&S technologies 
will not avoid all real world experi-
ments, but has defi nitively the 
| Fig. 3. 
Todays fuel cycle and fuel cycle options for the future closing of the fuel cycle.
| Fig. 4. 
Magnox development timeline as described by the Electric Power Research 
Institute [26].
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potential to reduce the number of 
steps as well as to improve the con-
fi dence in choosing the right/ideal 
settings for the still required experi-
ments. It seems essential to operate 
at least in a three step approach pro-
ducing real life facilities as marked in 
Figure 4 above by the red circles.  
There is the argument that the 
 MAGONX development is from a time 
that is too distant to be relevant today 
(1947 to 1956). Instead, let’s compare 
it with a more modern case, one of 
the last developments of a really new 
 nuclear power technology in the west, 
the pebble bed high temperature 
 reactor technology in Germany (see 
Figure 5). Even then, this was over 
3  decades ago (1966 to 1983). The 
process still indicates the three major 
steps, even if the order seems surpris-
ing – the small scale technology 
demonstrator  AVR before the zero 
power experiment. This approach was 
the  result of a very effi cient planning 
based on the experience with the 
graphite moderated reactor tech-
nology in the 60ies, specifi cally our 
previous case the MAGNOX pro-
gramme, and the  follow up AGR 
 programme which was an evolution of 
the MAGNOX technology. Even with 
th is experience of graphite tech-
nology, a skilled workforce, and 
 experience with building reactors, the 
developers came back to the zero 
power experiment (the KAHTER 
 facility) to gain a deeper insight into 
the mode of operation and the opti-
mization potential before taking the 
step to the industrial demonstrator 
THTR-300.
In the development of the indus trial 
demonstrator, the major arguments for 
the zero power experiment are the 
comparably low cost and the oppor-
tunity of rapid, fl exible, very well 
 instrumented tests to demonstrate and 
improve understanding of the system 
behaviour as well as to  support licen-
sing code validation, for example 
 forthe pebble fl ow [27]. The benefi ts of 
the zero power experiment are an al-
most immediate accessibility after shut 
down, the signifi cantly  reduced shiel-
ding requirements during operation 
and the fl exible  operational envelop , 
allow signifi  cantly faster take up of a 
relevant set of experimental results. 
Experiments of this kind are almost 
 impossible to implement in power pro-
ducing systems (in this case the AVR) 
with high operational temperature, 
high neutron fl ux, and a high radiation 
level due to fi ssion products and 
 material  activation. 
p How can we use this experience 
for the planning of a new, dis-
ruptive system? What are the argu-
ments for the initial step, an own 
zero or low power experiment in 
the UK for new developments? 
p Many arguments have been given 
in the last paragraph why a zero 
 power experimental facility is of 
high importance for the develop-
ment of a dis ruptive, new reactor 
technology. However, there are 
two questions remaining: Could 
we make progress relying on M&S 
without an experiment at this 
stage? Can we just go and ‘order’ 
some experiments for validation in 
another facility?
The massive use of M&S will help to 
create a much better overview of 
the opportunities and thus to optimize 
the nuclear system but it cannot 
 replace the experience in experiments 
 completely. Experimental data is 
at a minimum required to establish 
model credibility through a process of 
validation, especially since the per-
formance characteristics of any novel 
system are to an extent unknown. 
M&S will help to get the best possible 
outcome and reduce the number of 
costly experiments via a down selec-
tion process. 
There are clear reasons why the 
start of a nuclear programme is often 
associated for with the fi rst signifi cant 
reactor experiment, see the GLEEP 
 experiment in the MAGNOX process 
given in Figure 4. The decision for a 
low power experiment requires:
p a real commitment to kick off a 
 serious programme for building 
and operating the facility  and the 
formation of a team of specialists 
which is able to develop the project
p development and production of 
the fi rst key components, e. g. the 
fuel with governmental agency 
support needed to cover licensing 
and proliferation of nuclear 
 materials
p the establishment of a supply 
chain, bringing in Small and 
 Medium Sized enterprises and 
cross organisation agile delivery 
p the close interaction with the regu-
lator to get the experiment licensed
p strong links to nuclear innovation 
programmes, which will supply the 
innovative methods and partner-
ships to undertake our mission
Thus, the zero power experiment will 
help the UK to create/re-create the 
 essential skills basis in designing, 
 licensing, building, commissioning, 
and operating an innovative reactor 
of a completely new type. In addition, 
an experiment will 
p help creating international recog-
nition as basis for future colla-
boration
p give an opportunity for necessary 
safety demonstrations in the regu-
latory process of the next step
p leverage cost saving opportunities 
by reducing the uncertainty mar-
gins in the following design steps 
p create a business opportunity by 
providing fi nanced reactor experi-
ments for other MSR developers 
with their own designs who cannot 
collaborate due to sensitivities over 
sharing of IP.
p serve as a case study and collabo-
rative R&D platform for linking 
with international partners who 
want to access the UK market .
| Fig. 5. 
Timeline of the pebble bed reactor development in Germany.
| Fig. 6. 
Time and investment scales for the development 
of a disruptive nuclear system
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The 4 Steps in the Process
Based on the already proposed reduc-
tion of the number experimental facil-
ities a 4 step process will be developed 
with a rough description what should 
be achieved in each step. The 4 steps 
will have different time requirements 
and will be interlinked. The given 
timescales are based on the future 
plan of the BEIS (Department 
for Business, Energy & Industrial 
 Strategy) nuclear innovation pro-
gramme with the aim to have a 
market ready, in industrial application 
demonstrated product in 2050. 
 Figure 6 gives a qualitative overview 
on the time scales (construction and 
operation) and the required invest-
ment for the different steps. From the 
figure it already gets clear, that the 
 development of a new, disruptive 
 nuclear system does not require large 
investments in the first years (step 1 
and 2, see red mark), which opens 
the opportunity to work on different 
 systems in the early stages to down 
 select the options before the first large 
investment for the small scale demon-
strator is to be made. Current UK 
 strategy for AMR’s could provide a 
route to kick-start the necessary R&D.
Basic Studies
The basic studies of a new nuclear 
technology is the time to form a first 
consortium with academic partners, 
national laboratories, and industrial 
players to exploit the proposed dis-
ruptive approach and demonstrate its 
feasibility. It will provide attraction to 
the industry due to new long term IP 
creation, and provide scientific under-
pinning to their own proprietory 
 designs and ideally create public 
 belief and trust in the innovative 
 capacities of nuclear research, ‘we are 
solving the problems of the future’. 
The necessary modern digital M&S 
tools will be created and a pool of 
 experts will be formed. They will 
 identify possible deficiencies on M&S 
basis to work out the challenges and 
shape the future requirements in more 
detail. Basic studies will make use of 
the traditional strength of the country 
to leverage from recent governmental 
investments. New capabilities will 
be built up in subject areas where 
 currently strength is missing by 
 leveraging from international net-
working, working with supra-national 
institutions, and attracting specialists 
from abroad. 
Experiments can be used in order 
to establish fact (validation) or to 
 understand the characteristics of 
 critical components/processes of the 
system – proof of principle as well as 
to validate models using basic 
 experiments that examine separate 
 effects [25]. In general, large scale 
modelling does not by definition mean 
fewer experiments as the number of 
experiments could increase. But these 
will be smaller in scale – separate 
 effects – and more numerous, and 
can be delivered at a lower cost per 
 experiment.
The basic studies step will create 
the first interaction with the regulator 
to develop an understanding of a 
 reasonable safety approach and the 
definition of supporting experiments 
required for licensing. It will lead to 
international recognition which can 
be supported by establishing inter-
national research collaborations. This 
step will support the UK strategic 
 vision for the nuclear 2020 target to 
establish the capabilities & collabora-
tions necessary for a collaborative 
 research programme across industry 
and research organizations.
Advanced Studies
In this stage new technology 
 approaches (e. g. salt clean-up) have 
to be developed and demonstrated 
 using existing infrastructure lever-
aging past investments. For the scale 
up a hot salt laboratory for thermal- 
fluid dynamics and material inter-
action studies as well as a fuel lab for 
salt clean-up studies and fuel pro-
duction (for the zero power experi-
ment) has to be established. Advanced 
studies will leverage the traditional 
strength to create innovative ap-
proaches and can foster the develop-
ment of IP within the industry support 
base. Within this step, the zero power 
reactor will be a key stage to form a 
consortium and develop the skilled 
workers for the next step. Ideally, the 
zero power reactor can be based on 
refurbishment of a recently shutdown 
facility like it has been shown in the 
GUINEVERE experiments in Belgium. 
This approach has shown to create 
 significant cost and time savings. As 
already mentioned a zero power 
 reactor will create the  international 
collaboration opportunities and can 
serve with experiments for money for 
industrial players. A comparable 
 approach is offered, e. g. by the IPPE 
in Russia using the BFS  facility for 
fast reactor technology.
Experimental Reactor 
The experimental reactor is typically 
the small scale technology demon stra-
tor and the first step into a power pro-
ducing unit. However, it could be used 
later on as demonstrator for a small 
size reactor for remote siting. How-
ever, this dual approach will require a 
disruptive development in the process 
of establishing a  reactor system. In 
our case, the experimental reactor 
could be initially designed without 
salt clean-up, operating on enriched 
uranium (smaller and cheaper) 
 serving a market niche like the 
 Akademik Lomonosov for  remote site 
electricity production [28] or for pro-
pulsion. The system will be of small 
size with a power of 10 to 50 MWth 
even if the demonstration of the 
self-sustained operation on SNF will 
not be achievable in a such small size 
system. To limit and stretch the initial 
investment requirement the salt 
clean-up step could be added offline 
in a second development stage to 
demonstrate the new technologies. 
Detailed design, licensing, construc-
tion, and commissioning will create 
the future skilled workforce for the 
full scale industrial demonstrator. 
Close technological and financial 
 collaboration with industrial partners 
will be a key to create innovative 
 solutions in the supply chain as well 
as possibly a system integrator for 
the next step. At this point two ap-
proaches are possible, a collaboration 
driven approach for international 
 innovative reactor development, or a 
more commercially driven approach. 
The historic boiling water reactor 
 development shows that both ap-
proaches can even be followed in 
 parallel [26].   
In our case, the experimental reac-
tor will deliver the first operational 
experience with a liquid fuelled 
 system since the molten salt reactor 
experiment at Oak Ridge National 
 laboratory in 1965 to 1969 [29]. A key 
point for a rapid application of the 
disruptive innovation will be starting 
with a conservative approach with 
 reduced temperature level and low 
power density followed by a succes-
sive process of stretching the opera-
tional envelop to improve the  economy 
performance based on the operational 
experience and detailed observation 
of the material behaviour. The experi-
mental reactor is the first opportunity 
for material testing under real 
 operational con ditions involving high 
temperature, corrosive environment 
and high  radiation level. Taking the 
step into the experimental reactor 
 early will provide the developer with a 
steeper learning curve in a new 
 technology and thus an earlier suc-
cess, but sure on the cost of taking a 
higher risk.  Taking leadership will 
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give the developers the early lead in 
an innovative technology resulting in 
excellent  market opportunities. 
Full Scale Industrial System 
Demonstration
In this stage industrial demonstration 
of economic, reliable, sustainable, 
and safe power production using a 
new technology for the national as 
well as the international market is the 
essential function. The functionality 
of the entire nuclear system from fuel 
production over reactor operation as 
well as salt clean-up and off-gas 
 treatment as one unit has to be 
demonstrated, thus the application of 
a new highly sustainable low carbon 
technology. By providing the first 
 industrial demonstrator since genera-
tions, the UK will demonstrate in-
dustrial leadership and create the 
 related market opportunities required 
to achieve a significant market share. 
The industrial demonstrator can/
should already be owned by a com-
mercial operator and should be sup-
ported by the government in critical 
components like the nuclear island 
and the fuel as well as in the licensing. 
In the UK currently, this approach is 
consistent with current policy of 
 supporting industry through the 
 Advanced Modular Reactor pro-
gramme and is in-line with recent 
NIRAB recommendations to the UK 
government. 
The IP generated during the devel-
opment and operation of an industrial 
scale demonstrator will serve the 
 specific purpose of lowering the tech-
nical and commercial risk of licensing 
and operating a novel reactor tech-
nology. Commercial solutions will 
share some of the underlying tech-
nologies, though with additional pri-
vately held IP in  order to differentiate 
one commercial design from its com-
petitor.
By no means, the full scale de-
monstrator need to be a short term 
 operating prototype. Based on massive 
use of M&S it should be a well- 
developed, M&S supported, ideal ex-
periment which will be a first of class 
and thus go into full production for a 
significant time. There is history for this 
– the Calder Hall reactor, see Figure 4, 
operated for decades but it was also 
the full scale demonstrator. It powered 
Sellafield site (a large town in scale) 
[30], and was com parable to EBR-II at 
the Argonne-West site in US [31]. 
Closing remark
The link between the proposed 4 
 stages of the process, the required 
 information exchange between the 
stages, and a proposed time scale is 
given in Figure 7, supported by a 
 qualitative sketch for the national 
skills base and the requested shares of 
governmental investment.
The governmental share of the 
 required investment is proportionally 
higher in earlier phases of the project 
where the driver is to develop the 
 wider skills base. Later in the pro-
gramme, the share of government 
 investment is lower due to the fact 
that industry will be more able to 
 attract the investment needed to 
 commercialise the tech nology when 
it is demonstrated as an attractive 
investment opportunity. 
Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) has analysed the historic 
 development of 4 different reactor 
types [26]. In all cases, the develop-
ment activities have been carried out 
and financed by different partners in 
government and industry. The topic of 
the zero power reactor is typically in 
the hand of the government (not 
shown in Figure 8 since the study was 
based on power producing systems), 
while the next steps are shared with 
increasing level of industry involve-
ment correlated with the increasing 
maturity of the technology, see 
Figure 8 [26]. A detailed analysis 
 indicates that the nuclear island as 
well as the fuel fabrication and supply 
for the demonstrators are mainly 
in the hand of the government 
while  other com ponents are already 
delivered by the industrial partners. 
The main reason is that a new, inno-
vative fuel supply has to be handled 
on governmental level due to prolifer-
ation concerns while the nuclear 
 island is subject to supervision of the 
IAEA and the regulator.  
Based on the given arguments 
highly innovative reactor technologies 
without a planning for zero power 
 reactor experiment lacks the serious-
ness which is required to start such an 
important endeavour. Thus, investing 
into a reactor physics experiment on 
an innovative technology will imme-
diately give the UK a high profile in 
research and the connected inter-
national recognition.
Cost estimations given by insiders 
of the Indian fast reactor programme 
and the lead cooled fast reactor pro-
gramme in Russia indicate an overall 
investment volume of ~10bn$ and 
10bn€ respectively to achieve the level 
of the industrial demonstrator. Within 
the analysed historic US Programme 
the investment shares for the first of a 
kind reactor  ranged between 8 % and 
86 % governmental contribution with 
an average of ~ 40  % with higher 
 industrial contribution for mature 
technologies. In some promising tech-
nologies industry has already taken a 
significant share in the small scale 
demonstrator (e. g. BWR technology)
while in other high risk approaches 
even the industrial demonstrator has 
been supported by national govern-
ments.
Typically significant teams within a 
strong leadership in national pro-
grammes and research centres have 
been operated creating the required 
number of qualified experts and the 
 essential skills level for designing, 
 licensing, constructing, commis sio-
ning, as well as operating the ‘new 
 nuclear reactors’ at that time.
Conclusions
The energy trilemma and the UN 
 development goals form the key 
 driving forces for all kind of energy 
 research. Based on these require-
ments a universal vision for strictly 
demand driven strategic development 
has been worked out based on the key 
words: no resources requested, no 
waste produced while being highly 
economic, reliable, safe, and secure. 
Following this vision a mission for a 
future disruptive, demand driven 
 nuclear energy system with the 
 | Fig. 7.  
Interlinked development processes required for establishing an innovative.
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additional aim of solving the long 
term  nuclear waste problem is devel-
oped. Key point for the massively 
 improved sustainability indices is 
the operation in closed fuel cycle 
mode based on already existing spent 
nuclear fuel. Even if the advantages of 
closed fuel cycle operation are well 
known, the technology has never been 
established successfully due to the 
prohibitively high development cost 
and high commercial risk. 
In the first part, we describe the 
 requirement for a disruptive tech-
nology, an innovative molten salt 
 reactor operating on already exiting 
SNF without extensive and expensive 
pre-processing. The side requirement 
is on developing an online salt clean-
up, for online removing elements 
which prevent the reactor from long 
term operation. This approach will 
significantly  reduce the proliferation 
risk, the  radiation to human in fuel 
manu facturing, as well as the high 
 reprocessing cost and the even higher 
cost of solid fuel production, while 
opening a massive optimization po-
tential due to online linking of reactor 
and fuel cycle.
In a second part, we developed an 
innovative process to establish a new, 
disruptive nuclear system. In contrast 
to historic approaches, the new pro-
cess consist only of 4 major stages 
 supported by the massive application 
of modelling and simulation to reduce 
the number of required experimental 
facilities. The process is characterized 
by: basic studies, advanced studies 
and zero power experiment, small 
scale demonstrator, and finally the 
 industrial demonstrator. The process 
gives a clear structure for innovative 
nuclear development with specific 
roles which have to be taken over by 
the government and industrial players 
with different shares. It indicates 
the requirement to involve different 
partners, but the reward of the suc-
cessful development has the potential 
to give the world one of the most 
promising, sustainable, and reliable 
low carbon technologies. 
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